

An Engaged Culture : The Rhetoric and The Reality

The ongoing story of Sentinel matters material and behavioural



Air Cdre Robbie Noel


ISTAR Force Commander

Dr Mandy Walker

Applied Psychologist



The relationship between culture and safety



Similar Reports from Defence & Health Sectors

- “ A failure of Leadership, Culture, and Priorities ”.

Charles Haddon-Cave QC

The Nimrod Review : Board of Enquiry into 14 deaths ~ Oct 09



- “ ... This is a story of appalling and unnecessary suffering of hundreds of people. They were failed by a system which ignored the warning signs and put corporate self interest and cost control ahead of patients and their safety. What is required now is a real change in culture.”

Public Inquiry into care provided by the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust chaired by Robert Francis QC ~ Feb 2013

The relationship between culture and safety

Rhetoric?

28 October 2009 : Column 288

“Mr. Haddon-Cave also states that, in our pursuit of financial savings, the MOD and the RAF allowed their focus on safety to suffer. We accept this with regard to the Nimrod XV230. As a Department, we have a duty to continue to seek efficiencies in how we deliver defence, but I am absolutely clear that that must not be done with any detriment to safety”.

Daily Hansard Report ~ Spoken by the Secretary of State for Defence

Live Mandate : “ Embed an Engaged Safety Culture”.

Directive of the Secretary of State for Defence ~ since 2009

Current Standing Orders

“ I require that : All managers and commanders promote and lead by example on safety, health and environmental protection as part of normal business, thus developing and maintaining **a strong culture** where everyone understands and delivers their contribution to protecting people and the environment.”

Policy Statement of the Secretary of State for Defence ~ 2012



The ISTAR Force



“The eyes and ears of the Nation”



Our Context

Reality?

- Cold war origins
- Changing security paradigm
- Introduction to service 2008
- Operational imperative
 - Afghanistan 2008
 - Libya 2011
 - Mali 2013
- Military Aviation Authority (MAA)



Our Challenge


Reality?

- Support the Duty Holder chain
- Identify and address symptoms and causes
- Continue safe, effective operations
- Dispel myths, accept truth, build relationships
- June 2012 ~ a crisis of confidence and a lack of evidence



Direction of Travel for the Sentinel Joint Community

“ Sort out matters relating to Sentinel Safety Case, both material **and** behavioural ”




so that retention of Capability beyond 2015 is a realistic option that can be considered

Sentinel R1 Tiger Team

Active from
July 2012



Tiger Team Leads 

Gavin Wishart
Engineer

Mandy Walker
Psychologist

Transactional
Safety Engineering



Transformational
Safety Culture


Focus of Lasting Impact 


Air Worthiness

Air Safety

Focus of Lasting Impact 

Immediate
Priority 

Main Term
Focus 

Ultimate
Goal 

- Establish the facts
- Work to achieve an increasingly robust Safety Case
- Enduring confidence in the Sentinel Safety Case

- Identify the perceptions
- Work to clarify the perceptions and align effort in a common Safety Culture
- Enduring alignment across the Sentinel Joint Community

Immediate
Priority 

Main Term
Focus 





Ultimate
Goal 

After 6-9mths Tiger Team leaves 

Sentinel R1 Tiger Team

Active from
July 2012



A RISKY ENTERPRISE	 Disengaged	 Descending	 Ascending	 Engaged	A SAFETY CULTURE
Complicit	An organisational climate where individuals collude and ignore obvious risks to safety, entirely abdicating the responsibility for reporting safety-related matters.	An organisational climate where individuals are permitted to assume safety is the responsibility and concern of someone else entirely	An organisational climate where there are clear and straightforward mechanisms in place to enable the reporting of problems, errors and near misses and where people are encouraged and supported to use them	An organisational climate where people are readily reporting problems, errors and near misses.	Reporting
Punitive	An unhealthy atmosphere where people prefer to withhold safety-related information in order to avoid being the subject of blame or punishment	An atmosphere of blame and mistrust where people are fearful of providing safety-related information because of uncertainty about the consequences	A positive atmosphere where people are encouraged to raise concerns, with impunity, and where there is accountability rather than blame	An atmosphere of trust where people are encouraged and even rewarded for providing safety-related information and where it is clear to everyone what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour	Just
Rigid	An organisation locked into an established safety management system that stands rigid and rejects both challenge and change.	An organisation with overly complex safety processes and procedures, ill-defined responsibilities, and a prescriptive regulatory set, unfit for purpose in the face of substantial change.	An organisation that demonstrates some agility in changing circumstances whilst acknowledging the appropriate requirement to focus on safety	An organisation that can adapt to changing circumstances and demands while maintaining its focus on safety	Flexible
Arrogant	Organisational arrogance and corporate unwillingness to address the requirements of a safety culture.	Organisational unwillingness to address the requirements of a safety culture, preferring to pursue or protect local self interest.	Clear organisational willingness to improve and embed Safety Culture and develop competency in positive utilisation of safety information.	Organisational willingness and competence to draw the right conclusions from its safety information and the will to implement major safety reforms.	Learning
Ambivalent	People are ambivalent and reluctant to ask "What if?" and "Why?" questions, preferring to say nothing, and so, incubating mistakes.	People are disinterested in making any contribution to safety related matters and offered little encouragement or opportunity to engage.	People are interested in and encouraged to develop their personal understanding and corporate readiness to think about safety related matters and ask probing questions.	People are engaged, and ready to ask "What if?" and "Why?" questions that provide the antidote to assumptions, and reduce the possibility of incubated mistakes.	Questioning

Alignment of Effort : Tribal Challenges





Raytheon

This tribe ...	is ultimately worried about the loss of ...	and mitigates this by ascribing particular power to ...
Royal Air Force ISTAR Force Head Quarters	Life and/or Capability	Safety Officers, Safety Engineers
Royal Air Force & HM Civil Service	Reputation (as not delivering open competition and/or value for money)	Commercial Officers, Business Managers
Industry : Raytheon UK & Raytheon US	Reputation (as not delivering against contract), and the opportunity of future order book	Contracting Officers, Delivery Managers



Alignment of Effort : Tribal Challenges







In Human Factors terms : this was an exhausting environment requiring exceptional human energy in order maintain order and progress



Alignment of Effort : How we did it



How social culture holds together ...



Across the Joint Sentinel Community

SOCIAL DIS-ORDER

FAMILY VALUES



Across the Joint Sentinel Community

SOCIAL ORDER

FAMILY VALUES



A RISKY ENTERPRISE	● Disengaged	● Descending	● Ascending	● Engaged	A SAFETY CULTURE	
<p>T Training</p> <p>E Equipment</p> <p>P Personnel</p> <p>I Information</p> <p>D Doctrine & Concepts</p> <p>O rganisation</p> <p>I nfrastructure</p> <p>L ogistics</p> <p>I nteroperability</p> <p>Within this Joint Sentinel Community, across all Defence Lines of Development, these are the Family Values being promoted.</p> <p>These elements are those which are pursued, prized, promoted and valued.</p>					<p>An organisational climate where people are readily reporting problems, errors and near misses.</p>	<p>Reporting</p>
					<p>An atmosphere of trust where people are encouraged and even rewarded for providing safety-related information and where it is clear to everyone what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour</p>	<p>Just</p>
					<p>An organisation that can adapt to changing circumstances and demands while maintaining its focus on safety</p>	<p>Flexible</p>
					<p>Organisational willingness and competence to draw the right conclusions from its safety information and the will to implement major safety reforms.</p>	<p>Learning</p>
					<p>People are engaged, and ready to ask "What if?" and "Why?" questions that provide the antidote to assumptions, and reduce the possibility of incubated mistakes.</p>	<p>Questioning</p>

Evidence : Confidence



Integrating the effort of the **whole** Defence Aviation Community




Evidence : Confidence

HRB = Hazard Review Board
 HER = Hazard Evaluation Report
 TAA = Type Airworthiness Authority

Date	Duration	Progress	Outcome
HRB3 8 th October 2012	6 hours	Very slow and halting progress. SQEP attendees needed to design and agree process as they progressed. The very beginning of confidence building. Many new faces around the room, including Gp.Capt Hunt as the new TAA.	2 HERs Partially Sentenced
HRB4 28 th November 2012	5 hours	New SQEP Squad from ERA presenting argumentation; some unknown and not yet trusted faces. Much debate about process. Frustration felt by many in the room as SQEP effort was not genuinely aligned. HRB was adjourned.	The Board was unable to agree on any of the HERs presented
Reconvened HRB4 14 th December 2012	4 hours	Evidence of both growing confidence in one another and shared understanding of the evidence based arguments. Wg Cdr Tait noted : “Many of the safety arguments and assumptions that were the source of initial heated debate were being reused in support of later HERs, and people were starting to recognise the common logic and reasoning behind them.”	3 HERs Sentenced 1 st after (approx) 95 mins 2 nd after (approx) 55 mins 3 rd after (approx) 45 mins
HRB5 31 st January 2013	3 hours	Well socialised HERs prior to the HRB, and investment in a number of significant 1:1 clarifying conversations, contributed markedly to the achievement of this HRB. Wg Cdr Tait remarked: “While we are in the unenviable (but inevitable) position of implementing a process at the same time as designing it, that very process will bear fruit and make our lives easier. The MDAL and other detailed tools being produced by ERA will be a large part of this, enabling us to build up a convincing body of evidence”.	5 HERs Sentenced 1 st after (approx) 70 mins 2 nd after (approx) 25 mins 3 rd after (approx) 20 mins 4 th after (approx) 10 mins 5 th after (approx) 25 mins

Across the Team ISTAR Community



The Rhetoric

- A purpose built three storey office block to house the joint team of teams supporting the Sentry capability.
- These teams must collaborate in order to deliver this Force Element to the forward available fleet.



The Rhetoric

- Inside the building, this badge is prominently displayed in many areas
- Care has been taken by the leadership to communicate that the effort to support Sentry needs to be joint in order to succeed.



The Reality

- Inside the kitchens, there is not even collaboration around making a cup of tea ...
- Tribal culture abounds
- The leaders are now aware of the mismatch, and are preparing to tackle Sentry matters material and behavioural



Deductions and Next Steps

- Deeply rooted issues
- Work in progress
- Lessons are plain
- Utility of approach is clear
- Sustained progress depends upon not failing in

“ Leadership, Culture, and Priorities ..”

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Thank you for listening

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